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COMMENTARY
THE 1975 VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND
LANGUAGE MINORITIES
David H. Hunter*
The 1975 amendments1 to the Voting Rights Act of 19652 expand the
safeguards for minority voting contained in the 1965 Act in three ways.
First, expiration of certain provisions of the Act is delayed. Second, the cov-
erage of the Act is expanded geographically. Third, a new remedy-the
requirement of bilingual elections-is applied to a large part of the country.
Continuing the coverage of provisions enacted in the past and expanding the
geographical reach of these provisions presents few difficulties of interpreta-
tion.3 The bilingual requirement, on the other hand, because it does not
build directly on past experience 4 and because it suffers from a number of
drafting infelicities, is more problematical and will provide the focus for this
article. The 1975 amendments also raise several constitutional issues that
* Attorney, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice. B.A., 1964, Princeton University; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School. Mr. Hunter
was serving as Director of the Voting Rights Project of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights when this article was written. The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and not necessarily those of the United States Department of Justice or
of the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The author gratefully acknowledges
the helpful suggestions of Deborah P. Snow.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (Supp., Oct. 1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-4 (1970).
3. This, of course, is not to suggest that no problems remain in the construction
and application of the old Act. Reconciling the federal preclearance of changes with
respect to voting of section 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(Supp., Oct. 1975), with the normal allocation of responsibility between state and fed-
eral government and between branches of the federal government is not easy. See Rich-
mond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Connor v. Waller, 421 U.S. 656 (1975);
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690
(1971); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358
(1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The interpretation of section 5 is again before
the Supreme Court during the October 1975 term in three separate cases. United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 510 F.2d 512, cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975); East Carroll
Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, cert. granted, 422 U.S. 1055 (1975); Beer v. United
States, prob. juris. noted, 419 U.S. 822 (1974) (argued Oct. 1974 term, reargued Nov.
13, 1975). See authorities cited note 17 infra.
4. But see notes 26, 36, 38-41 & accompanying text infra.
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are deserving of attention but which will be examined only in passing.5
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted in response to decades of
exclusion of blacks from the electoral processes of Southern States, exclusion
that prior litigation and legislation had been unable to cure.0 It provided
the stronger remedies that experience under the Civil Rights Acts of the pre-
vious decade 7 had shown were needed. While the earlier Acts relied on liti-
gation to remove the barriers that prevented blacks from registering to vote
and voting,8 the 1965 Act added automatic and administrative remedies. 9
Because literacy tests and similar tests or devices' 0 had frequently been
used to keep literate and otherwise qualified blacks off the registration rolls
without deterring the registration of illiterate whites,"' Congress banned their
use in states and political subdivisions in which they presumably had contrib-
uted to low registration or voting rates. 12  Based upon their use of such de-
vices, six Southern States, part of a seventh, and a few jurisdictions outside
5. See notes 24, 25, 37 & 41 infra.
6. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309-15 (1966). The 1965 Act
is carefully analyzed in Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1965), and Comment, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 463. The century of experience leading to the passage of the Act, as well as its
subsequent construction and application, is extensively reviewed in R. CLAUDE, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1970), and Derfner, Racial Discrimination
and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1973).
7. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered
sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(c), 1971(e),
1974-74e (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(2), 1971(a)(3), 1971
(c), 1971(g) (1970).
8. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
9. The 1965 Act also refined the litigative approach of the earlier Acts. See, e.g.,
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (1970), which authorized the
courts to impose the special remedies of the 1965 Act, and Act of Aug. 6, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110 § 15, 79 Stat. 445, which amended the earlier Civil Rights Act by deleting
all references to "federal" so as to provide remedies for voting rights violations in state
as well as federal elections.
10. Section 4(c) defines "test or device" to include any requirement that a voter (1)
demonstrate literacy, (2) demonstrate educational achievement, (3) possess good moral
character, or (4) "prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or mem-
bers of any other class." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1970). For the history of federal
efforts to enforce voting rights, see Derfner, supra note 6, at 525-52.
11. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 312-13 (1966).
12. The ban on the use of tests or devices and the other special provisions of the
Act applied in states (and in political subdivisions in states not covered as a whole)
in which a test or device was maintained on November 1, 1964 and in which fewer than
50 percent of the persons of voting age were registered on November 1, 1964 or voted
in the November 1964 presidential election. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). The former determination was made by the Attorney Gen-
eral and the latter by the Director of the Census. These determinations were not subject
to judicial review. Id.
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the South were designated for "special coverage."' 3  In these jurisdictions,
the Act authorized the Attorney General to send federal examiners to list
eligible voters if local registrars still discriminated against blacks attempting
to register14 and to send federal observers to monitor elections in jurisdictions
in which examiners were serving.' 5
Congress, by passing the 1965 Act, indicated an awareness that the num-
ber of ways in which a group of people can be effectively disenfranchised
is practically endless.' As a further safeguard, it specified that before any
of the affected jurisdictions could make any changes that might affect
the right to vote, they would have to convince either the Attorney General
or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the new
practice or procedure was not discriminatory in its purpose and would not
be discriminatory in its effect.' 7 Under the terms of the original Act, a state,
or a political subdivision in a state not covered as a whole, would remain
specially covered until it could prove to the District Court for the District
of Columbia that for five years it had not used a test or device having either
13. The states of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
and Virginia, 40 counties in North Carolina, four counties in Arizona, and one county
each in Hawaii and Idaho were specially covered by the 1965 "trigger." Alaska, one
North Carolina county, three Arizona counties, and the Idaho county obtained exemp-
tion through a lawsuit under section 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970). Testimony of
J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of
Justice [hereinafter cited as Pottinger Testimony], Exhibit 1, Hearings on Extension of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 535, 595 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings].
14. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1970). The Attorney General
has designated 73 counties in 5 states for the appointment of examiners. Pottinger Testi-
mony, Exhibit 10, Senate Hearings 631-32.
15. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (1970). Observers have been
sent to 61 counties in five states. U.S. COMM'N ON CIviL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 398-401 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEN YEARS AFTER]. See
also Pottinger Testimony, Exhibits 14 & 15, Senate Hearings 635-37.
16. See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
17. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). Statistics on section 5
submissions and objections can be found in Pottinger Testimony, Exhibits 3-6, Senate
Hearings 597-600, and in TEN YEARS AFTER 402-09. Section 5 has been the most impor-
tant and the most controversial provision of the Voting Rights Act. See TEN YEARS AF-
TER 25-31; D. HUNTER, FEDERAL REVIEW OF VOTING CHANGES: How TO USE SECTION 5
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2d ed. rev. 1976); WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, THE
SHAMEFUL BLIGirr: THE SURVIVAL OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VOTING IN THE SOUTH
136-69 (1972); Derfner, supra note 6, at 576-81; Halpin & Engstrom, Racial Gerryman-
dering and Southern State Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations
Under the Voting Rights Act, 22 J. PuB. L. 37 (1973); Parker, County Redistricting in
Mississippi: Case Studies In Racial Gerrymandering, 44 MIss. L.J. 391 (1973); Roman,
Section 5 Of The Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an Extraordinary Federal
Remedy, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 111 (1972).
[Vol. 25:250
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the purpose or the effect of discriminating on account of race or color., s
Although substantial progress was made under the 1965 Act, 19 it was
apparent to Congress in 1970 that special provisions were still needed.20
Congress therefore extended the "bailout" provision, requiring 10 years of
freedom from the discriminatory use of a test or device,2 ' and at the same
time enlarged the coverage formula, bringing under special coverage a num-
ber of jurisdictions in the North and the West. 22 Congress also decided to
apply one of the special provisions-the prohibition of the use of tests and
devices-to the entire nation for a 5-year period.
23
I. TiH 1975 AMENDMENTS
On August 6, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford signed Public Law No.
94-73, amending the Voting Rights Act. The new law extends the principal
provisions of the 1965 Act (Title I), expands the coverage of the special pro-
visions to additional areas (Title II), requires bilingual elections in certain
areas (Titles II and III), and contains a number of miscellaneous provisions
(Title IV).
Extension. Deciding for a second time that the 1965 Act's special
provisions could not yet be abandoned, Congress tacked an additional seven
years onto their life. 24 Congress also made permanent the national ban on
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
19. For an assessment of the Act's implementation and initial effectiveness, see U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIOTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1968).
20. See H.R. REP. 91-397, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1969).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970).
22. 1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments §§ 4(a), 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c
(1970). The 1970 trigger covered for the first time five Arizona counties, two Califor-
nia counties, three New York counties, one Wyoming county, and numerous towns in
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Four Alaska election dis-
tricts, three Arizona counties, and an Idaho county were re-covered. Pottinger Testi-
mony, Exhibit 1, Senate Hearings 595-96. The Alaska election districts and the New
York counties brought successful bailout suits under section 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)
(1970). Senate Hearings, supra, Exhibit 2. The New York counties were subsequently
returned to the special coverage of the Act. New York v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 10
(D.D.C.), afj'd mem. 419 U.S. 888 (1974). See notes 36 & 50 infra.
23. Section 6 of the 1970 Amendments, 84 Stat. 315, added section 201 to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1970). In addition, section
6 enabled all voters to vote for the offices of President and Vice President, notwithstand-
ing state durational residence requirements, id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970), and
lowered the voting age to 18. Id. § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb-1 (1970). See
note 57 infra.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975), amending Voting Rights Act of 1965
§ 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970). The House of Representatives and the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee favored a 10-year extension, in order to require preclearance of
1976]
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tests and devices that was about to expire. 25
Expansion. Little thought had been given in previous congressional con-
sideration of voting rights legislation to the problems of minority groups other
than blacks. 20  But between 1965 and 1975, the development of the Chicano
changes made in district lines following the 1980 census. See H.R. 6219, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (received in the Senate, June 5, 1975); S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
15-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. The House subsequently accepted the 7-
year extension adopted by the Senate. See 121 CONG. REc. S 13,399-405 (daily ed. July
23, 1975); id. S 13,673-74 (daily ed. July 24, 1975); id. H 7629-34 (daily ed. July 28,
1975).
The 1965 Act raised the question of justification under the Constitution of intrusion
of the federal government into matters that had previously been the responsibility of the
states. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the Supreme Court up-
held under the fifteenth amendment the federal intrusion mandated by the special provi-
sions of the Act. In 1976, the question arises whether conditions are such that a con-
tinued federal role is constitutionally justifiable. This same question was posed by the
1970 extension of the Voting Rights Act, but it was not brought before a court for reso-
lution. The continued constitutionality of the Act's special provisions is supportable on
two theories. First, under the standards of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, and
especially under the more liberal standards of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653-
56 (1966), the basis for federal action still exists. Second, once it is determined that
Congress has the power under the Constitution to remedy a problem, how long a remedy
should apply is a legislative judgment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, at 653-
56 (1966).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa (Supp., Oct. 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1970).
The 5-year national ban was upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). All
nine Justices, in four opinions, agreed that Congress has power under section 2 of the fif-
teenth amendment to impose the ban. Most of the Justices found such power under the
fourteenth amendment as well. The opposite result with respect to the permanent ban
would require acceptance of the argument that because some day racial discrimination
will be eliminated and educational disparities between the races will be eliminated, Con-
gress may only enact temporary legislation. The acceptance of this argument would be
the equivalent of standing the hypothetical basis argument of Katzenbach v. Morgan on
its head. In addition, the force of Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45 (1959), which had been diluted by the time of Oregon v. Mitchell, is even
weaker now.
The basic principle [of Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S.
621 (1969), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), and City of
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970)] is that as long as the election
in question is not one of special interest, any classification restricting the fran-
chise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless
the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling
state interest.
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975).
26. One exception is section 4(e) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp.
I, 1965), which was designed to enable Puerto Ricans residing in New York, but edu-
cated in Puerto Rico, to pass New York's literacy test. See note 38 infra. Additionally,
some states and political subdivisions containing minority groups other than blacks were
inadvertently caught by the 1965 and 1970 triggers. These jurisdictions were usually
allowed by the Department of Justice to exempt themselves from special coverage. See,
e.g., New York v. United States, Civil No. 2419-71 (D.D.C., order of April 13, 1972)
[Vol. 25:250
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political movement27 and continued voting rights litigation in Texas28 con-
vinced many of the need for the protections of the Voting Rights Act in
Texas. 29  Although Texas had shared much of the experience of other
Southern States in denying a role in the political process to blacks, 0 it had
not used a test or device as a prerequisite to voting and therefore was not
included under the 1965 Act's special coverage.3
1
declaratory judgment rescinded, 65 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 888
(1974) (action on behalf of Bronx, Kings, and New York counties); Alaska v. United
States, Civil No. 2122-71 (D.D.C., July 2, 1972) (action on behalf of Election Districts
8, 11, 12 and 13); Alaska v. United States, Civil No. 1198-66 (D.D.C., Aug. 17, 1966);
Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966).
27. See generally, J. SHOCKLEY, CHICANO REVOLT IN A TEXAS TOWN (1974); Navarro,
The Evolution of Chicano Politics, 5 AzTLAN: CHICANO J. OF Soc. Si. & THE ARTS 57
(1974).
28. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (property requirement for voting in bond
elections); Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1974) (racial ger-
rymandering of commissioners' districts); Lipscomb v. Jonsson, Civil No. CA3-4571-E
(N.D. Tex., Mar. 25, 1975) (method of city council election in Dallas); David v. Gar-
rison, Civil No. T4-73-Ca-113 (E.D. Tex., Jan. 27, 1975) (method of city council elec-
tion in Lufkin); Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civil No. 5524 (E.D. Tex., Jan. 27, 1975);
Graves v. Barnes (II), 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex. 1974), remanded for determination
of mootness sub nom. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975) (per curiam) (multi-
member districts); Graves v. Barnes (I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), a! 'd in
relevant part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Carter v. Dies, 321 F.
Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (restrictive filing fees); Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100
(S.D. Tex. 1971), a! 'd per curiam sub nom. Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1974) (registration system); Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970), re-
manded, 401 U.S. 1006, dismissed, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1971) (assistance to illiter-
ates; continuing jurisdiction in district court noted).
29. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Charles I. Cotrell, Professor of Political Science,
St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas, Senate Hearings 452; Testimony of Ar-
thur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, id. at 73; Testimony
of George Korbel, Attorney, id. at 452; Testimony of Vilma S. Martinez, President and
General Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, id. at 756;
Testimony of Modesto Rodriguez, id. at 726.
The frustration of Mexican-American political efforts in California led some to a sim-
ilar conclusion with respect to that state. See, e.g., Testimony of Hon. Edward R. Roy-
bal, Congressman from California, Hearings on Extension of the Voting Rights Act Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 1, at 922 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
30. The White Primary Cases arose in Texas. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927). Texas also used a poll tax. See United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234
(W.D. Tex.), a I'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 155 (1966). For an analysis of the similarities
and differences between Texas and other southern states, see J. KoUSSER, THE SHAPING
OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-
PARTY SOUTH 1880-1910, at 196-209 (1974).
31. See Testimony of Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Senate Hearings 97.
1976]
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Title II is designed to apply the special provisions to Texas and to
scattered political subdivisions in other states.8 2  Coverage is provided if a
state, or a political subdivision of a state not covered as a whole, meets three
criteria: (1) more than five percent of the citizens of voting age of the juris-
diction are members of a single language minority group;88 (2) fewer than
50 percent of the voting age citizens34 of the jurisdiction voted in the 1972
presidential election; 5 and (3) that election was conducted only in English. 6
Title II jurisdictions are required to provide election materials in the lan-
32. The following jurisdictions have been designated for coverage under Title II thus
far: Alaska, Texas, and Arizona (statewide); California (Kings, Mercer, and Yuba
Counties); Colorado (El Paso County); Florida (Hardee, Hillsborough and Monroe
Counties); New Mexico (Curry, McKinley, and Otero Counties); New York (Bronx and
Kings Counties); North Carolina (Jackson County); Oklahoma (Choctaw and McCur-
tain Counties); and South Dakota (Shannon and Todd Counties). 40 Fed. Reg. 43746,
49422 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 783-84, 1503 (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(f)(3) (Supp., Oct. 1975). This determination is made by
the Director of the Census and is not subject to judicial review. Id. § 1973b(b).
For the definition of the phrase "language minorities," see p. 262 infra. The procedures
and standards for the determination of coverage have been challenged unsuccessfully by
the State of Texas. Briscoe v. Levy, Civil No. 75-1464 (D.D.C., Sept. 12, 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 75-1903, D.C. Cir., Sept. 16, 1975.
34. The criterion in the 1965 Act refers to "persons," presumably for convenience
and because the southern states, primarily affected by the 1965 Act, have small nonciti-
zen populations. Using citizens as a base here (and in the first criterion) makes sense
because noncitizens cannot vote. A countervailing factor is that census data are more
readily available for all persons than for citizens. As reported out of the House Judici-
ary Committee, this criterion referred to "persons" rather than to "citizens". The
change was made on the floor of the House. See 121 CONt. Rac. H 4884-93 (daily ed.
June 4, 1975).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975). This determination is made by the
Director of the Census and is not subject to judicial review. Id.
36. Id. § 1973b(f)(3). This determination is made by the Attorney General
and is not subject to judicial review. Id. § 1973b(b). "English-only election"
is a shorthand expression that refers to an election not conducted in the language
of the applicable language minority group. Thus, if a jurisdiction has two lan-
guage minority groups and publishes materials in the language of one of them, that
would not prevent the jurisdiction from being covered with respect to the second group,
although a literal reading of the statute would lead to that result. If the language mi-
nority group's only language is English, then English-only elections should not be con-
sidered to trigger Title II coverage. The prohibition of English-only elections had its
origin in court decisions holding jurisdictions' failure to provide election materials in
Spanish to be discriminatory against Puerto Rican voters under section 4(e) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970). See Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); cases cited note 39 infra. On the basis of Torres, the Department
of Justice asked the District Court for the District of Columbia to return the New York
counties to special coverage, on the theory that New York City's failure to provide Span-
ish language election materials constituted a test or device with respect to the city's
Puerto Rican voters. See note 50 infra.
,[Vol. 25:250
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guage(s) of the language minority group(s) present as well as in English.3 7
Although coverage is based on the presence of language minorities, the
special provisions will also protect racial minorities that are not language
minorities. Thus, blacks as well as Mexican Americans in Texas will be
protected.
Bilingual Elections. In recent years there has been an increasing trend
toward facilitating the registration and voting of those whose primary lan-
guage is other than English. Courts have used section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 196538 as a basis for requiring that election materials be pro-
vided in Spanish, 39 and several states provide for bilingual materials legis-
latively or administratively. 40  In requiring bilingual materials and assistance,
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(f) (4) (Supp., Oct. 1975). Congress has power under sec-
tion 2 of the fifteenth amendment to enact Title II if the objective of the Title is legiti-
mate under the Constitution and if the means employed are appropriate. There are two
main differences between the constitutional issues presented by the enactment of Title
II and those addressed in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). First,
a different factual basis exists. The discrimination on which Title II is based is not
as serious in terms of scope or effect as that which originally compelled Congress to
enact the 1965 Act. However, the Court did not imply in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
that a weaker factual basis would have been insufficient to justify the congressional en-
actment. Second, while the bilingual election requirement is a new remedy, it is anal-
ogous to the literacy test ban contained in the 1965 Act. Indeed, some courts have in-
terpreted the 1965 Act and 1970 amendments themselves to require bilingual elections.
See cases cited note 39 infra. For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by
Title II, see Senate Hearings 1043. For an analysis of the evidence concerning the need
for the protections of Title II in Texas, see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Staff
Memorandum, Expansion of the Coverage of the Voting Rights Act, June 5, 1975 (on
file at the Catholic University Law Review).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970). Under this provision, a person cannot be denied
the right to register on the basis of failure to satisfy a literacy test if he has completed
the sixth grade in an American-flag school. Section 4(e) was designed to enable Puerto
Ricans in New York City to register without satisfying New York's literacy requirement.
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966). The section was superseded
by the national ban on literacy tests passed in 1975, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa (Supp., Oct.
1975).
39. See Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575 (7th
Cir. 1973) (Chicago); Ortiz v. New York State Bd. of Elections, Civil No. 74-455
(W.D.N.Y., July 10, 1975) (New York State other than New York City); Torres v.
Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York City); Arroyo v. Tucker, 372 F.
Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Philadelphia); Coalition for Educ. in Dist. One v. Board
of Elections, 370 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1974) (New
York City); Marquez v. Falcey, Civil No. 1447-73 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 1973) (New Jersey);
Lopez v. Dinkins, 73 Civ. 695 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1973) (New York City).
40. These include the following states (or parts of states having a substantial popula-
tion in need of bilingual materials): Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico,
New York, and Pennsylvania. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Serv-
ice, Memorandum, Bilingual Voter Assistance in the United States: Results of a Tele-
phone Survey of Election Officials in the Fifty States and the District of Columbia, Mar.
1976]
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Congress not only built on this experience, but also determined that the states
were not meeting their responsibilities adequately or as rapidly as desired.
41
The bilingual requirements of Title ,III supplement those of Title II.
Title III requires bilingualism if more than five percent of the voting age citi-
zens of a political subdivision are members of a single language minority
group whose illiteracy rate is higher than the national rate.
42
11, 1975 (on file at the Catholic University Law Review). See also TEN YEARS AFTER
23-25. The bilingual provisions and experiences of Alaska, Florida, and New Mexico
were discussed during congressional debate. See 121 CONG. REC. H 4807 (daily
ed. June 3, 1975), S 13648 (daily ed. July 24, 1975), S 13589-92 (daily ed. July 24,
1975).
41. The House and Senate Committees, however, had before them very little informa-
tion on bilingual elections in the various states. What information was available is sum-
marized in H.R. REP. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22, 29-30 (1975) [herein-
after cited as H.R. REP.] and S. REP. 32-34, 39. It would seem logical that, if
Congress has power under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to ban the
use of literacy tests, it should likewise have the power to ban English-only elections. See
notes 25 & 37 supra. Any possible constitutional infirmity in Title III is contained in
its apparently restrictive bailout provision. See p. 266 infra.
42. The same groups are considered language minorities for Title III as for Title II.
For a definition of the phrase "language minorities," see p. 262 infra.
The relevant section reads as follows:
Prior to August 6, 1985, no State or political subdivision shall provide reg-
istration or voting notices . . . only in the English language if the Direc-
tor of the Census determines (i) that more than 5 percent of the citizens of
voting age of such State or political subdivision are members of a single lan-
guage minority and (ii) that the illiteracy rate of such persons as a group is
higher than the national illiteracy rate: Provided, That the prohibitions of this
subsection shall not apply in any political subdivision which has less than five
percent voting age citizens of each language minority which comprises over
five percent of the statewide population of voting age citizens.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975). These determinations are made by the
Director of the Census and are not subject to judicial review. Id. Illiteracy is defined
as "the failure to complete the fifth primary grade." Id. By its language, this provision
requires (in a state in which members of a single language minority group constitute
more than five percent of the state's voting age citizens, when that group in that state
has an illiteracy rate greater than the national rate) the coverage of a five percent lan-
guage minority county in which the illiteracy rate is not higher than the national illit-
eracy rate. Such a county, however, presumably can bail out from coverage immedi-
ately. See p. 267 infra. This section should be interpreted to call for a comparison
of the illiteracy rate of voting age citizens of the jurisdiction in question who are mem-
bers of the language minority groups with the illiteracy rate of all voting age citizens
in the United States. See S. REP. 39. Title III has been determined to cover some or
all of the political subdivisions in 30 states. 40 Fed. Reg. 41827-28, 43044-45, 49587-88
(1975).
Titles II and III leave in doubt the status of non-English-speaking groups in jurisdic-
tions not covered by these titles and of non-English-speaking groups who are not in-
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Bailout. The special provisions of the Voting Rights Act and the bilingual
requirements of the 1975 Act were intended to apply only where they are
needed and only for a limited period of time. Jurisdictions can remove them-
selves from coverage ("bail out") by making an appropriate showing to an
appropriate court. In addition, Title III automatically expires on August 6,
1985.
43
A jurisdiction covered under the Act as originally passed, or as amended
in 1970, can bail out by proving to -the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that during the 17 years preceding the filing of the action
no test or device was used with a discriminatory purpose or effect. 44 The
use of a test is disregarded if "(1) incidents of such use have been few in
number and have been promptly and effectively corrected by state or local
action, (2) the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and
(3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the future. ' 45
Although a number of jurisdictions have bailed out from the 1965 or 1970
cluded in the definition of language minorities. Sections 4(e) and 201 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e), 1973aa (1970), have been interpreted together to
prohibit the use of English-only elections when they discriminate against Puerto Ricans.
See Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 579 (7th
Cir. 1973). Because literacy tests have now been abolished nationwide, no continuing
significance can be attached to section 4(e), which regulated their use. When Congress
made the national test ban permanent, it did not amend the definition of test or device
to include English-only elections, as it did for most purposes the definition contained
in section 4(c). Instead, it enacted Titles II and III as temporary measures requiring
bilingual materials for certain groups in certain jurisdictions. These Titles are now the
sole federal statutory bases for requiring bilingual elections. For other groups and other
jurisdictions, relief must be sought under the Constitution or under state law. Cf. note
50 infra. It should be noted, however, that this result was not deliberately intended,
or even considered, by Congress. See S. REP. 31-37.
43. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975). A jurisdiction that previously
bailed out by proving 10 (or 5) years of nondiscrimination required by earlier
provisions of the Act will not have proved the 17 years now required. Such a jurisdic-
tion arguably should be automatically re-covered and required to bring a new bailout
action. The Act, however, has never been interpreted to require this. Jurisdictions that
bailed out between 1965 and 1970 were allowed to remain uncovered after the passage
of the 1970 amendments, unless they were caught by the new trigger. See Pottinger
Testimony, Exhibit 1, Senate Hearings 595-96. In considering the 1975 amend-
ments, Congress did not discuss the possibility that jurisdictions that have bailed
out would be re-covered even if they were not caught by the 1975 trigger. See 121
CONG. REc. H 4806-07, H 4827-29 (daily ed. June 3, 1975) (discussion of coverage of
Alaska); id. at S 13329-30 (daily ed. July 22, 1975) (congressional staff memoran-
dum).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(d) (Supp., Oct. 1975). The Attorney General is di-
rected to consent to a bailout declaratory judgment if he "determines that he has no rea-
son to believe that any such test or device" has been used to discriminate. Id. § 101(a),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
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coverage, 40 no Southern State covered as a whole has bailed out. 47
Title II bailout differs only in the proof that is required. The absence
of a discriminatory use of English-only elections must be proved,48 and 10
years of nondiscrimination are required rather than 17.49 A jurisdiction can
bail out from Title IH coverage by proving to the local federal district court
that "the illiteracy rate of the applicable language minority group within the
State or political subdivision is equal to or less than the national illiteracy
rate."50
46. See notes 13 & 22 supra.
47. Both the state of Virginia and Gaston County, North Carolina made unsuccessful
attempts to bail out. Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd
per curiam, 420 U.S. 901 (1975); Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
Both cases rested on the theory that a literacy test has a discriminatory effect when the
state provided an unconstitutionally inferior education to blacks. The Voting Rights
Act, however, was based on the finding that literacy tests were used directly as discrimi-
natory devices and that this discriminatory use of literacy tests indicated the existence
of discrimination in voting generally. The enactment of a permanent national ban on
the use of literacy tests provides an appropriate occasion for the reconsideration of the
Gaston doctrine. The Senate, however, rejected an amendment to repeal the Gaston
doctrine. See 121 CONG. REc. S 13658-60 (daily ed. July 24, 1975).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975). The jurisdiction must also prove
the absence of discrimination on account of race, color, or membership in a language
minority group in the use of other tests and devices. Id.
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(d) (Supp., Oct. 1975). But see p. 266 infra. The bill
reported by the House Judiciary Committee specified the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. The specification of that court was deleted in the House.
See 121 CONG. REc. H 4897 (daily ed. June 4, 1975). See also id. at H 7632 (daily
ed. July 28, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Edwards). A Title III bailout action is not re-
stricted, however, to the local federal court, since a jurisdiction might find it more con-
venient to ask for a Title H and a Title III bailout in the same proceeding which would
have to be brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Because the proof requirements for bailout are different under the three Titles, bailout
from one Title leaves unaffected a jurisdiction's status under the others. In this regard,
the position of the New York counties is unique. Bronx, Kings and New York Counties
are covered under determinations made under the 1970 amendments to the 1965
Act solely because of the discriminatory use of English-only elections. See note
36 supra. Because the 1975 Act excluded English-only elections from the defi-
nition of test or device for the purpose of determinations for the 1965 and 1970
triggers, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(f)(3) (Supp., Oct. 1974), the New York counties should
only be considered covered under Titles II and III. As a result, section 5 should not
apply to New York County, because that county, unlike the other two, is not expected
to be covered by Title II. S. REP 66. Moreover, coverage for the counties under the
1970 amendments presumably would last until 1991, 17 years after the order returning
them to special coverage, New York v. United States, 65 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C.), affd
mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974), while coverage under Title II presumably, and under Title
III definitely, lasts only until 1985. This result of the 1975 Act was not considered
by Congress.
Although Congress excluded English-only elections from the definition of test or de-
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Other Amendments. Private enforcement of voting rights is facilitated by
Title IV, which authorizes private parties to use the authority of section 3
of the Voting Rights Act to apply the special remedies to any jurisdiction
in the country,"1 whether previously covered or not.52 Section 3 authority
previously had been restricted to the Attorney General and had remained
unused.53 To further facilitate private enforcement, Title IV authorizes the
payment of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in voting rights cases. 54 This
provision is intended to apply only when the prevailing party is seeking to
vindicate or safeguard minority voting rights. 5
In addition, in order to provide a basis for measuring progress under the
Voting Rights Act, Title IV directs the Census Bureau to conduct biennial
surveys of registration and voting by race in specially covered jurisdictions.
The Civil Rights Commission can ask the Census Bureau to conduct
additional surveys in other jurisdictions.56
vice for the purpose of determinations under the 1965 and 1970 triggers, it did not make
a similar exclusion for the purpose of bailout. See § 4(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b
(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975). Thus, if English-only elections discriminated against Amer-
ican Indians in Neshoba County, Mississippi, that state, arguably, would not be able to
bail out until 1992. (Any previously covered jurisdiction could be in a similar situa-
tion.) However, this interpretation, which was not considered by Congress, conflicts
with the scheme created by Congress of establishing separate requirements and separate
bailouts under the three Titles.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973a (Supp., Oct. 1975). The 1975 Act also amends section 3
by providing for its use to protect language minorities. The combined effect of these
amendments was an overbreadth in section 3, which was only partially cured by section
410, added in the House. See 121 CONG. REc. H 4900-01 (daily ed. June 4, 1975);
Pottinger Testimony, Senate Hearings 593.
52. When use of section 3 was restricted to the Attorney General, it was only rele-
vant in jurisdictions not specially covered, since preclearance and the suspension of tests
and devices were automatically required by the Act and the Attorney General could use
federal examiners and observers without seeking court approval. Private parties will
now be authorized to ask a court to send examiners and observers to a specially covered
jurisdiction in the absence of action by the Attorney General. See H.R. REP. 33-34.
53. See Pottinger Testimony, Senate Hearings 566.
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 19731(e) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
55. This section is designed to be interpreted similarly to the attorneys' fees provi-
sions in other civil rights statutes. A prevailing party on the other side will be awarded
fees only when the suit was "frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes."
S. REP. 41; 121 CoNG. REc. H 4720 (daily ed. June 2, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Ed-
wards). But cf. 121 CONG. REC. H 4900-01 (daily ed. June 4, 1975) (remarks of Mr.
Butler).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-5(a) (Supp., Oct. 1975). This survey provision supersedes
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(f) (1970). Fiscal con-
siderations prevented the Title VIII surveys from being carried out. See House
Hearings 1607-25. It should be noted that the passage of the 1975 provisions did not
guarantee the funding of the directed surveys. See S. REP. 64.
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Other provisions of the 1975 Act codify the effect of constitutional amend-
ments and Supreme Court decisions with respect to the 18-year-old vote
5 7
and the poll tax,58 codify the Department of Justice regulation permitting
expedited consideration of section 5 submissions for preclearance,59 and fill
minor gaps in the 1965 Act. 60
II. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTING BILINGUALISM
Although the broad requirements of the 1975 amendments are clear, prob-
lems of interpretation are apparent when the additions to the Act that re-
sulted from the new legislation are closely examined.
Language Minorities. The Act defines language minority group to
mean Asian Americans, American Indians, Alaskan natives, or persons
of Spanish heritage."' "Asian American" is further defined, in the legislative
history, to mean Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Filipino American.
62
57. In the 1970 amendments, the voting age was lowered to 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973bb
to 1973bb-4 (1970). The Supreme Court upheld this provision only with respect to fed-
eral elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Since the twenty-sixth
amendment later completed the work attempted by Congress in 1970, the 1975 amend-
ments substituted a new 18-year-old Title empowering the Attorney General to enforce
the twenty-sixth amendment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973bb (Supp., Oct. 1975).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973h (Supp., Oct. 1975). This section was amended to take into
account the twenty-fourth amendment, which prohibits the use of the poll tax as a pre-
requisite to voting in federal elections, and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), which similarly prohibits its use in state elections. The change also adds
the twenty-fourth amendment as a basis for the congressional authorization of enforce-
ment by the Attorney General.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (Supp., Oct. 1975), codifying 28 C.F.R. § 51.22 (1975).
The Department's interpretation of the 60-day requirement was upheld in Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536, 540-41 (1973).
60. The Act amends section 11 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit multiple voting
in federal elections and provides criminal penalties for violation of the provision, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1973i(e)(1) (Supp., Oct. 1975), and to protect the elections for delegates
to Congress from Guam and the Virgin Islands. Id. § 1973i(e) (2).
61. Id. §§ 19731(c)(3), 1973aa-la(e). Providing protection for "language mi-
norities" was a compromise between those who wanted to protect only persons of
Spanish origin and those who wanted the bill to be drafted to protect any minority
race or color group whose mother tongue is other than English. The first ap-
proach was taken in H.R. 3501 and H.R. 5552, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
For the latter approach, see Pottinger Testimony, Exhibit 37, Senate Hearings 710-
11, and Flemming Testimony, id. 77-78. The second approach depended for its
success on considering Mexican Americans and other persons of Spanish-speaking
background to be a group protected under the fifteenth amendment because of their
race or color. Although the Department of Justice had administered the Act on
this assumption, which appeared to have a sound legal basis, see Pottinger Testimony,
Exhibit 32, the fifteenth amendment approach was rejected by Congress.
62. See H.R. REP. 16 n.16, which also gives a more precise definition of the other
groups.
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Of the four language minority groups, only one, persons of Spanish heri-
tage, has a single language.63 Although the Act specifies that five percent
of a jurisdiction's citizen voting age population must be members of a single
language minority group before Title II or Title III coverage will attach, it
does not give directions -for a jurisdiction that is, for example, three percent
Japanese American and three percent Korean American. Although the leg-
islative history suggests a congressional expectation that both languages be
used, 64 a more reasonable interpretation would be that bilingual materials are
required only if a group sharing a common language satisfies the five percent
test.65 Otherwise, a jurisdiction that was three percent Japanese American and
had no residents of Korean origin would have no obligation to provide mate-
rials in Japanese, while a jurisdiction with three percent of each would be re-
quired to provide bilingual materials to both groups.66
The legislation does not specify which groups are to count as Asian
Americans, but the intent of Congress apparently was to use that term to
refer only to the four groups listed above since these are the groups of Asian
origin counted by the census. 67 Because these are the principal Asian Ameri-
can groups, there is no pressing need to question the restriction made in the
legislative history. Nevertheless, should the 1980 census reveal,68 for
63. The Census Bureau definition of Spanish heritage, in the five southwestern states,
includes persons who are of Portuguese origin, because Spanish and Portuguese surnames
are indistinguishable. See note 62 supra. Thus the statement in the text is overly
broad.
64. See 121 CONG. REc. H 4718 (daily ed. June 2, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Edwards);
id. at H 4886 (daily ed. June 4, 1975). But cf. 121 CONG. REc. H 4892 (daily ed. June
4, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Duncan).
65. This interpretation should be adopted for Asian Americans but not for American
Indians or Alaskan natives. For the latter groups, oral assistance, which is easier to
provide, will generally be sufficient. See generally note 71 infra. In addition, the cen-
sus makes separate determinations for the four Asian American groups but not for indi-
vidual tribes. See H.R. REP. 16 n.16; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POP-
ULATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, pt. 1, § 2,
at app. 15.
66. Other complications arise both for the determination of coverage and for the pro-
vision of bilingual materials. Several different languages are spoken in the Philippines.
Various dialects of Chinese differ in their oral, but not their written, forms. Different
versions of Spanish are spoken by persons of different national origins. Because the
census gathers no information relating to these distinctions, it is reasonable to ignore
them for the purposes of determining coverage. It is more difficult to ignore them, how-
ever, when the bilingual requirements are implemented. See note 70 infra.
67. See note 65 supra. Hawaiians are apparently excluded from the Asian American
category even though they are counted as a group by the census because "the Hawaiian
language is seldom, if ever, used .... ." 121 CONG. REC. H 4716 (daily ed. June 2,
1975) (remarks of Mr. Edwards). But cf. 121 CONG. REc. H 4886 (daily ed. June 4,
1975) (remarks of Mr. Matsunaga).
68. Title III, unlike Title II and the 1970 and 1965 triggers, does not specify a de-
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example, that five percent of some jurisdiction's population are Vietnamese
American, a strong case could be made for requiring the provision of election
materials in Vietnamese.6 9
Bilingual Elections. If a jurisdiction is covered with respect to a particular
language group, whenever it "provides any registration or voting notices,
forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the
electoral process, including ballots," it must provide them in the language of
that group.70 An exception is made if the language historically has been un-
written, as American Indian and Alaskan native languages frequently have
been. With respect to such languages, the jurisdiction is only required "to
furnish oral instructions, assistance or other information relating to registra-
tion and voting."'71
Congress did not specify how a bilingual election system was to operate,
apparently preferring to allow the covered jurisdictions, the Department of
Justice, and the courts to work out the details.7 2  In many precincts there
will be no, or very few, voters who are members of the language minority
termination at a particular time. Coverage, therefore, should not be considered locked
in by the results of the 1970 census.
69. For the bilingual provisions to be workable, there must either be a restriction on
the groups to which they apply, or on the percentage of a group that must be present
before the provisions are activated. There is no need, however, for both restrictions.
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(c) (Supp., Oct. 1975). When a particular language
group has a language with more than one form (e.g., Chinese), or has more than one
language (e.g., Filipino), the covered jurisdiction must implement the bilingual require-
ments in a way that effectively provides for the needs of various substantial subgroups.
The view was expressed during the debate that bilingual materials or assistance would
only be provided in the single form, dialect, or language "generally used" by the mem-
bers of the language group. 121 CONG. REC. H 4890 (daily ed. June 4, 1975) (remarks
of Mr. Edwards). When two forms are in common use, the intent of the Act would
not seem to allow so restrictive an interpretation.
71. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973b(f)(4), 1973aa-la(c) (Supp., Oct. 1975). Although it is
not stated in the Act, the oral assistance must be in the language of the language mi-
nority group. See 121 CONG. REc. H 7631-32 (daily ed. July 28, 1975) (remarks of
Mr. Edwards). Title 111, but not Title H, contains an additional, but superfluous, clause,
which was added during the Senate debate, relating to historically unwritten Alaskan na-
tive languages. See 121 CONG. REc. S 13654-58 (daily ed. July 24, 1975). On this pro-
vision's lack of effect, see id. H 7631 (daily ed. July 28, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Ed-
wards).
72. See 121 CoNG. REC. S 13588-89 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Tun-
ney). Jurisdictions covered under Title II must satisfy the preclearance requirements
of section 5, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (Supp., Oct. 1975). The Department of Justice has
the authority to enforce the bilingual requirements of Title II under 42 U.S.C. § 1973j
(d) (1970), and to enforce Title III under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-2 (Supp., Oct. 1975).
Private parties can also enforce the bilingual requirements. See H.R. REP. "Interim
Guidelines Regarding Language Minority Groups" have been published by the Depart-
ment of Justic€. 40 Fed. Reg. 46080 (1975),
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group or who need bilingual materials. It would be reasonable, therefore,
for a jurisdiction to identify which voters require the bilingual materials and
to provide the materials only for them. When different materials must be
printed for each precinct, moreover, they could be printed only for those pre-
cincts in which a significant number of language minority voters reside.
78
Inconsistent Requirements of Titles II and III. Titles 1H and III were
intended to work together to provide bilingual elections in some jurisdictions
and not only bilingual elections, but also the other special remedies of the
Voting Rights Act, in other jurisdictions.74 The scheme created by the Act,
however, does not always successfully carry out this intent. Under Title 11,
a state as a whole apparently can be required to provide bilingual materials,
75
while Title III operates only at the county level. 76 This leads to the result
that more than 100 Texas counties, covered by Title II but not by Title III,
would be required to provide election materials in Spanish although less
than five percent of their voting age oitizens are of Spanish origin. 77 Because
neither a need nor a rationale for this result was demonstrated by Congress,
78
it would be reasonable not to require bilingual elections in jurisdictions
covered under Title II only because of statewide coverage and not covered
under Title III, or in Title II jurisdictions which have bailed out from Title
III coverage.
79
Termination of Bilingual Requirements. A jurisdiction can bail out from
Title II coverage if it can prove that its use of English-only elections was not
73. See 121 CONG. REC. S 13588-89 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Tun-
ney); S. REP. 39.
74. See H.R. REP. 22-24, 30-3 1.
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
76. Id. § 1973aa-la(b).
77. S. REP. 67.
78. While the legislative history contains no discussion of this issue, one possible jus-
tification for this distinction between Titles II and III might be that certain Texas coun-
ties (Dallas and Tarrent) contain large Mexican American populations although their
percentage of the total is less than five. However, it is difficult to understand why
Dallas and Fort Worth should be treated differently than Chicago, whose Spanish her-
itage population is at least as large, but also constitutes less than five percent of the
total. See Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 578
n.8 (7th Cir. 1973). Cf. note 43 supra.
79. There is some indication in the legislative history that this is how the two Titles
were intended to be interpreted. The Alaskan language amendment, discussed in note
71 supra, was placed only in Title III, although Alaska is covered under Title II. Pre-
sumably it was intended to supersede the Title II requirement, to the extent that there
is a conflict. Likewise, correspondence between Senator Tunney and Assistant Attorney
General Pottinger, 121 CONG. REc. S 13588-89 (daily ed. July 24, 1975), refers only to
Title 1II, although it was intended as a general interpretation of the bilingual require-
ments of the Act,
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discriminatory in either purpose or effect.8 0 Although this should be a
reasonable basis for permitting a jurisdiction to return to the use of English-
only elections, a Title II bailout does not have that result since most Title
II jurisdictions will also be covered by Title 111.81 And, since bailout from
Title M requires proof that the literacy rate of the language minority group
present in the jurisdiction is equal to, or higher than, the national rate,8 2
which could be a nearly impossible test to meet even if practically all of the
language minority citizens in the jurisdiction were completely literate in Eng-
lish,8 3 a jurisdiction could remain covered under Title III despite its satisfac-
tion of Title II requirements. However, since this reslt conflicts with the
assessment by Congress that Title II jurisdictions had more severe problems
than Title III jurisdictions, 84 it would be reasonable to interpret Title III to
require the court to allow bailout if the literacy rate test is met and to author-
ize the court to allow bailout if the court is satisfied that there is no need
for bilingual materials. 85
Two provisions of the Act support this interpretation. First, the precise
definition of literacy in the subsection specifying the coverage formula is
restricted to that subsection alone,8 6 which suggests that a court in a bailout
80. See pp. 259-60 supra.
81. The exceptions are the states of Alaska and Texas, which are covered as states
under Title II, but some of whose political subdivisions are not covered under Title III,
and Todd County, South Dakota. See 40 Fed. Reg. 41827, 41828, 43746, 49422, 49587,
49588 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 783, 1503 (1976).
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(d) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
83. Only 4.6 percent of American citizens of voting age have not completed the fifth
grade. U.S. Bureau of Census, Press Release CB75-196 (Sept. 3, 1975). Thus, 95 per-
cent of a language group could satisfy this requirement and bilingual materials and as-
sistance would be required for the one person in 20 who does not. On the other hand,
many people who have completed the fifth grade do not know how to read and write;
if the schooling was in a different country, fifth grade completion has no relationship
to English literacy. The problem of finding a relevant criterion for the need for bi-
lingual materials arises because the census does not provide statistics on the language
that people actually speak but only on the "mother tongue," the language spoken in a
person's home during childhood. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 65, at appendix
17.
84. See H.R. REP. 31.
85. In addition, a jurisdiction that has bailed out from Title III, but not from Title
II, should be allowed to reinstate English-only elections, although the other special reme-
dies of the Act would apply. The Title II bailout test looks at historical rather than
present discrimination, which is relevant for the other special remedies, but not for the
bilingual requirement. Title II bailout, moreover, for a state covered as a whole, is not
allowed for political subdivisions. Requiring one county to have bilingual elections be-
cause they are needed in another county is a result that conflicts with the desire of Con-
gress to minimize the expense and burden of the bilingual requirements. See 12 CONG.
REC. S 13588-89 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Tunney); S. REP. 39.
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
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action could be more flexible. Second, in contrast to bailout from pre-1975
coverage or from Title II, bailout actions under Title III are brought in the
local federal district court rather than in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.8 7  This suggests that Congress wished to have a
court familiar with local conditions decide whether bilingual elections are
needed. 8
8
There are seven states in which one or more language minority groups
constitute five percent or more of the state's citizen voting age population
and in which the illiteracy of those groups exceeds the national average.89
Individual counties are not covered under Title III if -the state's five percent
language minority group constitutes less than five percent of the county's
population.9" There is no such exemption if the literacy rate of such a group
is equal to or exceeds the national rate.91
This creates a dilemma. The liberal interpretation of Title III bailout
advocated above only makes sense if counties can bail out individually.
Otherwise a county would remain covered when there is no need for bilingual
elections. However, if a county could bail out individually, then a covered
county with a language minority group literacy rate equal to, or above, the
national rate could bail out immediately and automatically. This would
make Congress' determination that such a county should be covered a nullity.
Keeping such a county covered, however, conflicts with the clear expres-
sion of policy that individual political subdivisions should not be covered
under Title III if there is no need for that coverage. 92 Consequently, individ-
ual political subdivisions should be allowed to bail out when the language
minority group's literacy rate is equal to or exceeds the national rate, even if
they are in one of the seven states covered by the five percent provision.98
Not only should individual county bailout under Title III be allowed, it
87. Id. § 1973aa-la(d). See note 50 supra.
88. Moreover, a jurisdiction can be covered under Title III even if the language of
the language minority group in the county is extinct. It would make no sense to
prohibit such a jurisdiction from bailing out. See CONG. REC. S 13340-44 (daily ed. July
22, 1975) (discussion of the Chickahominy in Charles City County, Virginia).
89. These are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, New Mexico, and
Texas. 40 Fed. Reg. 41827, 43044-45 (1975). This is characterized in the Federal
Register, inaccurately, as "statewide" coverage.
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The legislative history fails to indicate that a distinction between these seven
states and the other states in which Title III jurisdictions are located was even intended.
See 121 CONG. REc. H 4719 (daily ed. June 2, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Edwards).
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should be required. That is, a state in which all counties are covered9 4
should not be allowed to bail out in a statewide suit unless each county
within it satisfies the bailout requirement. Otherwise, a county with a lan-
guage minority group with a high literacy rate could balance out a county
with a group with a low rate, defeating the congressional purpose of covering
individual counties even if a state is not covered as a whole.95
Coverage under the pre-1975 Act is not triggered by -the presence of any
particular minority group.9 " Protection is provided for any minority race or
color group, and is terminated only if there has not been discrimination
through the use of tests or devices against any such group.9 7 Coverage under
Titles II and III, however, is based on the presence of a particular language
minority group,98 which suggests that bailout from the bilingual requirements
should be allowed with respect to a particular group. There is no purpose
in requiring a jurisdiction to provide materials in Spanish solely because, for
example, Navajos in the jurisdiction cannot read English (or Spanish). Thus,
Title III bailout should be allowed with respect to individual language minor-
ity groups. 99 Partial bailout, however, should not be allowed under Title II,
for Title II coverage has, in addition to the bilingual election requirement,
all the consequences of special coverage. Any racial or language minority




The problems surrounding the bilingual election requirements of the 1975
amendments to the Voting Rights Act are largely attributable to the lack in
94. The only states in which all counties are covered are Arizona, Hawaii, and New
Mexico. 40 Fed. Reg. 41872, 43045 (1975).
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975). A state cannot bail out from
1965 or 1970 coverage or from Title II unless each of its counties satisfies the bailout
requirement.
96. Id. § 1973b(b).
97. Id. § 4(a); see text accompanying note 44 supra.
98. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973b(f)(3), 1973aa-la(b) (Supp., Oct. 1975). The determina-
tions of coverage have all been made with respect to particular language minority groups.
99. For the Act to be consistent, bailout should be allowed by a jurisdiction with re-
spect to the same language minority groups that triggered coverage.
100. Representative Don Edwards, in his exposition on H.R. 6219 at the beginning of
the House debate, stated that Title III bailout would be possible with respect to various
groups or subgroups. His remarks concerning Title II bailout could be interpreted simi-
larly, but there he was focusing on the problem of providing materials in several Asian
languages. See 121 CoNG. REc. H 4718 (daily ed. June 2, 1975). As a result of an
amendment subsequently adopted, no jurisdiction will be covered under Title II because
of the presence of Asian Americans. See note 34 supra. See also the discussion at 121
CONG. REc. H 4884-92 (daily ed. June 4, 1975), which indicates unresolved confusion
about the status under the bill of language minority groups and subgroups.
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Congress of a clear notion of the problem to be remedied. Congress had
before it little information concerning the extent to which members of various
groups cannot communicate effectively in English and the extent to which
this language disability is a deterrent to effective exercise of the franchise.
Congress also had little information on the effectiveness of the bilingual
requirements recently imposed by state laws and court decisions. 101
The primary concern of the early advocates of expansion of the coverage
of the Voting Rights Act was not bilingual elections, but the preclearance
requirement of section 5. Specifically, it was believed that Mexican Ameri-
cans residing in Texas needed this protection.' 0 2 A criterion was sought,
therefore, that would single out Texas, and court cases requiring bilingual
elections suggested a means to that end. 10 Thus, early drafts of the legis-
lation used the English-only criterion to provide coverage for Mexican Ameri-
cans and were designed especially to ensure coverage for Texas.' 0 4 To over-
come objections to this narrowness, the principles of the early drafts were
later generalized to provide coverage for other language minority groups and
to provide bilingual elections, but not section 5 coverage, for additional juris-
dictions.105
While the voting legislation was before Congress, from January to August
1975, congressional supporters of expanded legislation were more concerned
with the political implications of the legislation than with the administrative
and judicial problems that would arise when Congress had finished its work.
The result was greater attention to assuring that a bill showing concern for
the voting problems of Mexican Americans would pass than to carefully de-
lineating these problems (and those of other minority groups) and drafting
a bill to meet them.
The 1975 Act should be interpreted with this history in mind. Greater
101. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. H 4733 (remarks of Mr. Butler), H 4738 (remarks of
Messrs. Badillo and Goldwater), H 4747 (remarks of Mr. McClory) (daily ed. June 2,
1975), H 4747 (remarks of Mr. Frenzel), H 4825-26 (remarks of Messrs. McClory and
Drinan) (daily ed. June 3, 1975), S 13642 (remarks of Mr. Tower), S 13646-47 (re-
marks of Mr. Bayh) (daily ed. July 24, 1975). See also notes 40, 41 supra.
102. See Letter and Memorandum from the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund to J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, Jan. 22, 1975, in Senate Hearings 771.
103. See note 39 supra.
104. H.R. 3247 and H.R. 3501, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The latter bill explic-
itly protected only persons of Spanish origin. The former bill was more generally
drafted but had the same effect. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Staff Memoran-
dum, House Hearings pt. 2, at 938. H.R. 3501 was designed to provide coverage for
California as well as Texas, but this attempt was abandoned because a satisfactory
formula could not be found. See id. Neither bill contained a provision like Title III.
105. See note 61 supra.
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weight should be given to the clear congressional purpose-to remedy the
voting problems of language minorities-than to the particular language used
by Congress to fulfill this purpose. It is too early to speculate whether the
bilingual requirements will be made permanent after the 10-year trial period
has ended. An important distinction between the bilingual requirement and
the suspension of literacy tests, which was made permanent after a 5-year
trial, is that the former creates substantial administrative burdens and
requires significant expenditures while the latter is practically cost free. Just
as permitting illiterates to vote and providing them with assistance is not
intended to encourage illiteracy, providing election materials in a language
other than English is not intended to compromise the role of English as the
national language but to prevent the exclusion of qualified citizens from the
electoral process. The right of non-English-speaking citizens to vote can be
expected to remain protected to the extent that bilingual requirements do not
place unreasonable burdens on the nation's registration and voting systems.
